Nutrology: a specialty in the light of Aristotle’s theory of virtues

Abstract

This essay defends nutrology from Aristotle’s theory of virtues, focusing on the concept of prudence
(phrónesis). It is argued that medicine, and, by extension, nutrology, is a form of practical prudence,
crucial for the integral treatment of patients. The text explores how rational action in medicine is
informed by a goal, which has prudence as a vital element to apply general principles in specific actions.
Medical diagnosis, perfectible and discursive, is examined as a process that aligns the physician’s mental
representations with the patient’s context. Therapy is presented as a series of actions that induce
desired organic responses, with medical prudence directing the choice of treatments. It is concluded
that medicine, including nutrology, represents a specific prudence, justified by the need for specialized
approaches to nutritional disorders and diseases.