

# An immunitary genealogy: bioethics and the pursuit of human self-preservation

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## Abstract

Briefly exploring the historical context and the main topics of bioethics, this article argues that the subject has its own way of coping, which is characterized by a mechanism that operates in pursuit of human self-preservation through the continue discussion on the attributes that define humans. This mechanism – which is central and unifies the discipline's heterogeneity of concepts and moral perspectives - is contextualized in a broader horizon of meaning, which Esposito calls the paradigm of immunization. Finally, the article indicates possible contributions that the immune interpretive key can offer to bioethics, regarding the tensions within the field and the descriptive and normative functions of bioethics.

**Key words:** Bioethics. Biopolitics.

## Resumo

### Uma genealogia imunitária: a bioética e a busca da autoconservação humana

Explorando brevemente o contexto histórico e os principais tópicos da bioética, o artigo argumenta que existe um modo de enfrentamento próprio da disciplina, caracterizado por um mecanismo que opera visando à autoconservação humana a partir da discussão sobre os critérios de qualificação do humano. Este mecanismo, central e unificador à heterogeneidade de concepções e perspectivas morais da bioética, é contextualizado em um horizonte de sentido mais amplo, que Esposito denomina paradigma imunitário. Finalmente, são delineadas algumas possibilidades de contribuição que esta chave interpretativa imunitária pode oferecer à bioética, no que tange às suas tensões internas e funções descritiva e normativa.

**Palavras-chave:** Bioética. Biopolítica.

## Resumen

### Una genealogía inmunitaria: la bioética y la búsqueda de la auto-conservación humana

Explorando brevemente el contexto histórico y los principales temas de la bioética, el artículo sostiene que hay una manera de enfrentamiento propio de la disciplina, que se caracteriza por un mecanismo que opera con el objetivo de auto-conservación humana a partir de la discusión de los criterios de calificación del humano. Este mecanismo, central y unificador de la heterogeneidad de conceptos y perspectivas morales de la bioética, se contextualiza en un horizonte más amplio de significado, que Esposito denomina paradigma Inmunitario. Por último, son indicadas posibles contribuciones que esta clave interpretativa inmunitaria puede ofrecer a la bioética, en lo que respecta a sus tensiones internas y funciones descriptiva y normativa.

**Palabras-clave:** Bioética. Biopolítica.

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The author(s) declare(s) that there is no conflict of interest.

Bioethics is in crisis and, if unless its practice is rethought, there will be no future. This is an increasingly common affirmation in literature. One of the reasons of this present crisis would be the relation established with biomedical knowledge, contributing for a decreased critical power of bioethics<sup>1-3</sup>. In other readings, the tendency of specialization, impeded by the emergence of new technoscientific developments, threatens the future of bioethics<sup>4</sup>. When considering the history of this discipline, however, it is observed that the critiques to the lapse between the speed of knowledge production and the capacity of examining it ethically contextualize bioethics since its emergence.

The work "Bioethics: bridge to the future", the first book about this discipline, justly proposes a field of knowledge that aims to serve as an instrument to overcome the lapse of communication, as a bridge that links science and humanity<sup>5</sup>. In this perspective, bioethics seeks to address a urgent problem: without the necessary dialogue with humanities, the increasing and inexorable scientific development and its great potential of transforming the environment represent a threat to humanity. Then, for ensuring human conservation, bioethical thought would have to be grounded in *the adoption of an endurance criterion as an action guide and the debate on what type of endurance should we defend*<sup>6</sup>.

According to Potter's perspective, the task of the discipline would be to morally reflect on the scientific progress, although with a clear purpose: the conservation of the human species. And more: considering that its action would not only focus on the mere endurance, it becomes necessary to debate what would qualify this endurance<sup>7</sup>. Therefore, bioethics may be seen as a mechanism of human self-preservation, and which operation assumes a continued debate on what is human.

However, also simultaneously to Potter's suggestion, the term bioethics emerges with another connotation. Months after launching Potter's book<sup>5</sup>, the Kennedy Institute of Ethics is funded. Apparently disregarding the wider concern about the preservation of the human species, the Institute, based at Georgetown University, had as objectives the research and debate on bioethical issues, understood as concrete medical dilemmas related to the biomedical area<sup>8</sup>. Eight years later, with the publication of the first issue of Principles of Biomedical Ethics<sup>9</sup>, bioethics stabilises itself hegemonic in academy as synonyms of Biomedical Ethics.

It seems to be, at least, two distinct conceptions of the discipline that develop in parallel. For

the most predominant, bioethics is dedicated to the thinking of ethical issues from the biomedical practice, and Potter's contribution represents a historical aspect of small practical influence. In parallel, there is a perspective that emphasizes the relevance and importance of Potter's insights for the reflection of global bioethical issues<sup>10,11</sup>.

In a short time, this divergence of perspectives becomes part of various historical narratives on discipline<sup>8</sup>. In contrast, the present work will argue that these conceptions, apparently so different, become closer for sharing the same *modus operandi*. Briefly exploring the historical context of its emergence and the main topics of the discipline, the goal is to uncover evidences of an own *modus operandi* of bioethics, characterized by a mechanism that operates focusing on the human self-preservation from a debate about the criteria of its qualification.

The role this mechanism plays for the discipline - at the same time central and unifying, will be analyzed in order to identify the bioethics activity in a wider horizon that Esposito<sup>12</sup> names paradigm of immunization. Finally, the present article aims to illustrate the possibilities of contribution that this interpretative key of immunity offers to bioethics.

### Bioethics: searching for a common thread

The existence of many and diverse narratives about the origins of bioethics is target of countless efforts of systematization<sup>13</sup>. Even its North American origin, seen as a common fact among so many versions<sup>14</sup>, contrary arguments are found. Recently, the number of authors who credit the first mention of bioethics term to the German philosopher Fritz Jahr, in 1927, have been increasing. In this perspective, Jahr might have been considered the precursor of bioethics not only for the pioneer use of the term, but also for his intuitions about the complexity of moral challenges imposed by the scientific development<sup>15-18</sup>.

Beyond the disagreement on the origin of the term and bioethics itself, the lists of events, studies, and authors seen as pioneers also vary substantially. This great amount of recent narratives on discipline may be attributed to the collective attempt to academically establish and legitimize a complex discipline<sup>14</sup>. In fact, the historical controversies are only a facet of the complexity of the bioethical phenomenon.

Searching for moral solutions for the questions faced, bioethics assumes a character as public discourse in politics, and also one in the academy, interdisciplinary. Different perspectives and areas

of expertise are consequently developed, varying according to the purposes and the contribution offered to the bioethical debate<sup>19</sup>. Most likely, however, the most notable difference in conceptions is the one seen between Potter's global bioethics and the legacy of Georgetown Institute. This distinction would apparently delineate a diverse range of objects of study, foundations and theoretical approaches.

On the one hand, when understood as synonymous of biomedical ethics, bioethics focuses on human health (in contrast to a more global and ecological perspective) and in the moral aspects of therapy, research and health politics. Some of the main themes would be: abortion; cloning; genetic improvement and engineering; commercialization of human organs and tissues; euthanasia; stem cell research and therapy; reproductive technologies; clinical researches; patient rights and informed consent; and allocation of health resources<sup>20</sup>. On the other hand, even if not necessarily sharing all assumptions of Potter, the present systematizations on global bioethics oppose to compartmented conceptions of ethics and suggest interdisciplinary integration to morally confront globalized issues. In this perspective, in addition to the biomedical topics, some themes are debated: ecosystem and biodiversity; the ambiguous uses of scientific findings; knowledge, power and corruption; and poverty<sup>21</sup>.

At first sight, the common thread that links abortion, eutanásia and resource allocation in health seems epistemically vague. In turn, to comprehend the global bioethics scope seems difficult, considering its coverage. Would there be a more common aspect between these bioethics themes that could serve as inclusion (or exclusion) criterion for issues faced in the future, within this context? What could make a global issue turn into a global bioethical issue? It equals to finally ask if it would be possible to identify a connection between these two bioethics, besides their names.

The emphasis in internal divergences to bioethics culminates precisely in the question that drives the present article: is there, after all, a common thread that could unify the heterogeneity of narratives, perspectives, and objects in a same field of knowledge?

The answer to this question is positive and the argument to be developed is that what engenders in the same range such heterogeneous conceptions of the discipline is the specific *modus operandi*. It is directed to one purpose: human conservation; and driven by one dynamics: the qualification of its operational criteria. In other words, different notions of

bioethics are characterized by its goal of preserving what is human and by the constant need of measure what qualifies, and, ultimately, defines the humanity to be preserved. This mechanism not only connects theoretically the different objects of the discipline, but also reflects the type of analysis that bioethics makes about them.

To develop the thesis, it is initially emphasized the key role that the ambiguity of scientific knowledge played in the genesis of bioethics. In a second phase, the text will point how the risk / threat perception of human survival made the discipline to develop itself around human conservation and its qualification mechanisms.

### Ambiguity of the scientific knowledge

During post-World War II, the scientific development becomes subject of ethical reflection, not for finding itself in crisis, but because it is not possible to fully predict the risks of its success and achievements. Precisely, they are successful scientific findings, as the new medicines with unknown side effects, as an example, revealing the ambiguous nature of the scientific enterprise, able to improve the conditions of human life as it threatens survival. It is then realized that the scientific development, precisely for its major achievements, is able to challenge moral convictions and produce unexpected risks<sup>22</sup>.

It is usually said that this type of concern about the survival of species regards Potter's thoughts and a little contribution could have been given to the current predominant conception of bioethics<sup>20</sup>. This affirmation does not consider, however, that biomedical ethics has also been through periods of intense debates on morally ambiguous nature of scientific knowledge. Hellegers may be the most emblematic founders of Kennedy Institute of Ethics, who described bioethics as a manner of foregrounding the impacts of medical technology, that would morally impact not only the ills but also humanity<sup>8</sup>.

Jonsen<sup>23</sup> reinforces the importance of this concern about human survival for the establishment of bioethics within biomedical field. The creation of North-American institutes, dedicated to the theme, as Georgetown Institute and Hastings Center, is subsequent to a period of intense debates on the impact of scientific development for human survival.

The perception of the ambiguity of scientific knowledge, therefore, constituted a common denominator between the different conceptions of bioethics. This fact does not evade Potter's percep-

tion and, based on this understanding, he himself contradicts the independence of biomedical and global bioethics fields. A Conference of the American Association for Cancer Research points Georgetown Institute as an example that bioethics have been a success in the academy. In the occasion, directly quotes the passage in which Hellegers affirms that bioethics does not restrict science, but to remind that both science and medicine are at service of people. In fact, even that Potter criticizes the compartmentation of discipline, for him bioethics is not in disagreement with its own notion, once it shares the objective of morally limit the usage of the scientific knowledge<sup>24</sup>.

### Human self-preservation and the qualification criteria

Given the ambiguity of scientific knowledge and the threat represented to humanity, human survival and the debate on what (human) characteristics we wish to keep become central to global bioethics<sup>6</sup>. In turn, biomedical ethics, whose scope and purposes redefine themselves after a series of conferences in the 60s, faces the same questioning. The first of them, named *The great issues of conscience in modern medicine*, in Josen's words, *ruled not only the survival questioning or humans extinction, but what type of survival? A future of what nature?*<sup>23</sup>

For biomedical perspective, scientific development would impose challenges to human survival that could go beyond nuclear threat and the depletion of environmental resources. The technological improvement of means to support life, as the invention of artificial dialysis equipments and organ transplants has imposed the need to revisit moral and scientific parameters to determine human death and survival<sup>23</sup>. Thus, it is observed that the ambiguous character of technoscientific development, either in its global dimension or in biomedics practice, presents as moral dilemmas for bioethics questions of survival and the determination of parameters for its preservation.

The reason for it is that, while anthropic action, science serves as a self-preservation, once it intends to extend and improve human life conditions, individually and collectively, however its efforts take humans and their context as objects of intervention and change. Consequently, not only new risks for mankind arise, but the perception itself of what are the attributes that define themselves is put into debate.

To ensure that the scientific development is able to contribute for human self-preservation and not to be a threat to it, bioethics faces the task of debating moral values, continuously questioning what exactly it intends to preserve. This is the debate behind, on the one hand, the search for scientific and moral parameters of beginning and end of life, and on the other hand, the debate on values to be respected during medical intervention, as autonomy, dignity, etc. This initial context is critical to give personality to bioethics, to develop a common mechanism that would unify different concepts of bioethics, facing moral dilemmas, that scientific development imposes itself while human self-preservation mechanism.

However, bioethics itself is a self-preservation mechanism. And for accomplishing this task it must continuously debate what characterizes this humanity it tries to conserve. Therefore, it is seen that the normative function of bioethics is justly exercised from a continuous debate on zones of indistinction, moving boundaries between subject and its biological substract, between the person and the community. Bioethics analysis, the the objective of human preservation, implies constant reflection about the categories used to define the status of living organisms, including the human being.

### Immune Paradigm

The debate on the attributes that qualify the human being and the continuous displacement of distinction zones between human and non-human constitute a dynamic present in Western tradition, at least since the classical Aristotelian perspective of human being as a political animal (*zoon politikon*). The displacement and repositioning of this split and its articulations work as a decision instance, constantly updated on what is human<sup>25</sup>.

Effectively, since its beginning, politics bases itself on the provision for defining the human identity by contrast, that is, opposed to what is non-human. Limited as exclusion space of zoe (an organic life as the animals), the political context establishes itself as the place for an exclusive qualified human life, *bios*. However, this moving frontier between human and non-human, between bare life (zoe) and qualified life (bios), transforms coincidentally with the rise of modernity. Since then, bare life (zoe), whose exclusion was the founding condition for politics, occupies now the central role of power relations, establishing a biopolitical configuration of society<sup>26</sup>.

Biopolitics is precisely marked by power strategies based on the control and reproduction of life, and consequently, on the promotion of a biological body in the center of a political life<sup>27</sup>. From this biopolitical configuration result the enlargement of social prestige of scientific knowledge, especially the biomedical, and the subsequent emergence of biotechnoscience, one of the main objects of debate in bioethics<sup>28</sup>. Resulting from progresses in the biological field, especially in subareas of molecular biology, biochemistry, genetics and neuroscience, the biotechnoscience represents the effort of overcome limitations imposed by the organic structure of life and comprises the set of theoretical and practical tools that aim to improve life quality of human beings<sup>28</sup>.

As a know-how lead for the technical intervention in live beings and processes, biotechnoscience and its moral aspects are proeminently biopolitical. The social prestige of biomedical knowledge and its project of extending and improving human life has been resulting in a comprehension of mankind predominantly based in its biological components, available to the biotechnoscience intervention. In this context, bioethics would function as an opposition mechanism, resisting to the negative effects of biopolitics, revealing and fighting the moral consequences of reducing humanity simply to its biological data<sup>29</sup>.

To resist to undesirable results of biotechnoscience, however, it is important to remember that its morally ambiguous character, that at the same time preserves and threat, derives from an ambivalent biopolitics itself. On the one hand, the new biopolitical order is defined in contraposition to sovereign power derived from the death prerogative. In this perspective, life preservation takes a central political role and the promotion of health and individual rights become strong mechanisms of subjectivation. On the other hand, mankind reduction to its biological dimension contextualize the technoscientific instrumentalization of men, the racism and nazism<sup>30</sup>.

According to Esposito<sup>31</sup>, biopolitics is crossed by an antinomy on which Foucault would never stood definitely, representing it sometimes as a mechanism of subjectification and life reproduction, and other times as nullification and human death. It is from this irresolution, still according to the author<sup>31</sup>, that derives the contrast between the positive connotation of biopolitics, from Hardt and Negri<sup>32</sup>, who understand it as a form of resistency to sovereign power (from *Empire*), and the negative one, from Agamben<sup>26</sup>, who identifies it as a continuity of sovereign power.

Foucault's indecision and the divergence in his reception, however, do not only derive from a dubious historical articulation between sovereign power and biopolitics. For Esposito, the reason for the antinomy is the very own relationship between life and politics, thought by Foucault as distinct categories that articulate with each other, forming a biopolitical configuration. For this reason, immunity is proposed by Esposito as an interpretative key that would explain the inseparable connection between them, and consequently the intrinsic contradictory character of biopolitics. The immunity, in this perspective, bases the type of mutual dependency relationship between life and politics, considering that power relates to life and life needs power relations to sustain itself. Instead of emphasizing the moment when life and politics intersect, immunity highlights the conservative dynamics that characterizes the necessary relation between life and politics<sup>31</sup>.

More precisely, the immunitary self-preservation characterizes itself for a negative protection of life, which means, for an antinomian and artificial movement that, even intending to preserve life, contradicts the natural self-preservative means. Self-preservation, essential element in human history, takes place only in a condition of protective denial of natural mechanisms of preservation and, consequently, the technique initiates as a means for ensuring the conservation of a constant altered life, inevitably artificial. The negative quality of immunitary protection exactly relies on the idea that the peculiar human self-preservation derives from the restriction and deprivation of a portion of its own constitution<sup>33</sup>.

The notion of deprivation is present in the etimological origin of immunity word (*immunitas*), established in denial of the word community (*communitas*). While *communitas* is bound by a munus – an obligation of mutual outreach and therefore never appropriate –, immunity is the deprivation of the obligatoriness of the gift, always followed by defense mechanisms against the exploratorial effects of community. Immunity presupposes the existence of self, which has to be protected from its annihilation, that is, the expropriation represented in the relation with the other<sup>12</sup>.

This brief etymological excursion reveals not only the negative and restrictive nature of immunitary mechanisms of human self-preservation, but also the structural influence that the relationship between individual and community plays in the development of the privatistic and individualistic logic of modernity<sup>12</sup>. The expressive role of immuni-

ty concept in medicine and law diffuses into other fields, from international relations with diplomatic immunities to computer science, with computer antiviruses. This concept, according to Esposito<sup>34</sup>, is fundamental to comprehend modernity and, although there are diverse conceptions depending on the field, it refers to and increasingly anticipated need of protection from a risk/threat to which others are exposed.

If immunity has been always imprinting forms of preserving life, the immunity paradigm, or immunization, is a theoretical systematization of a horizon started with modernity. Although the self-conservative need is a political assumption, once society and mechanisms of defense are inseparable, only modernity inserts the need of self-preservation of an individual life as the central issue and arises from it the institutional apparatus<sup>31</sup>. To contribute to what we call the modern subject, in turn, immunity builds a continuity solution, an artificial emptiness in Esposito's expression<sup>12</sup> that, at the same time, prepares and puts individual and community in relation, the self and the other.

In this perspective, what is assumed as the center of modern biopolitics, subject to self-preserved biopolitics actions, is not a bare life zoe, purely natural or biological, not also a form of political life, as the classical conception of bios, but life that lies precisely in the point where this distinction becomes diffuse and loses significance<sup>31</sup>. Biopolitics life is a life permanently immunized and in continuous displacement in the indistinction zone between bios and zoe, between human and non-human, between the self and the other. It is exactly within this artificial emptiness, in this indistinction zone, that the "person device" operates: a decision mechanism of humanity<sup>35</sup>.

This device acquires its current expression by revitalizing the category person after World War II. In that occasion, the subtraction of the citizen status to etnical groups in Nazi Germany put them in sub-human conditions. Thus, the reinvigoration of this category gave a greater universality if comparing to the citizen one, conceptually filling the gap between citizen, subject of rights in a particular nation, and the individual, while universalized condition of man. A relation of direct implication between humanity of an individual and his right to have rights was sought<sup>35</sup>.

More than a legal aspect, the resumption humanist assumptions was the response to tragical consequences of human *flattering* to its biological data. Repealing the nazi denial of any element that could transcend biological human life, the revital-

ization of the category human person intended to recognize the existence of a thing that could adhere to the living being a changes his status, giving it a uncontroversial and inviolable value<sup>35</sup>.

The key to comprehend what Esposito<sup>35</sup> calls device of the person is exactly the adherence concept. To characterize this perception, roman origins are taken for the word *persona*, the performative mask that adheres into the actor's face, without fusing to it. The appropriation of the concept by the cristian tradition, according to the author, deepens even more the idea of adherence, once in this tradition, *while indissolubly connected to a living body, the person does not integrally coincide with it and, inversely, finds its most intrinsic element precisely in that non-coincidence that allows traffic to after life*<sup>35</sup>.

The person category, thus, relies in this mismatch between subject and biological substract supported by it. However it has been justly retrieved to avoid animalization/human reification, experienced during Nazism, the category ends up producing a different effect of what expected. For Esposito<sup>35</sup>, to be considered as an adhering thing, but that not confounding to the biological body, the concept of person results in the contrary of its aspiration to integrity, producing a split individual. Instead of abolishing the division between man and anima, it eventually introjects the perspective, that was social, within each individual. The Aristotelic theme of man seen as a racional animal is then retrieved.

Consequently, one receives the status of person who, within animals, is capable of rationally dominate it biological body and it animality – and, in biotechnological times, offer it. It is precisely this split that gives mobility to the definitions of organisms. The device of the person would, therefore, consist in an immunitary echanism which operates normatively within the indistinction area between body and subject. Through a contiuous displacement of categorical frontiers, the device defines the living beings status within the extremes of animalization and personification<sup>35</sup>.

The device of the person causes, consequently within the same individual, personalization effects – from its rational portion – and of depersonalization – of ist body portion, thus animalized. The dominance on its corporeal portion simultaneously gives the individual the status of person, and its body the status of appropriable thing, available for its dominance and intervention<sup>35</sup>. This mechanism, named device of the person, is determining for a reference of human rights and hystorically contextualizes the emergence of bioethics. For this reason, it becomes

a central and unifying element for heterogenous positions, apparently contrary in the discipline.

In this perspective, the very own existence of bioethics while moral debate space derives from the division, historically operated by the device of the person, between person and body, that reifies the last one. Thus, the themes bioethics takes for itself are moral resultants of human self-preservation intent by science, which proposes to intervene on the body. Consequently, in addressing those themes, both the defense of quality or sacredness of life are positions of debates in bioethics that disagree on what belongs to the body, but not as its appropriate character. In Esposito words, *either those who defend for themselves the availability of the own body – to improve it, modify it, lease it, sell it, suppress it – or those who declare themselves unavailable for being an intangible property of God, the State or nature, must assume the tradition. Only because is reported in advance as res extra commercium category, human life is declared sacred for some and qualified for others*<sup>35</sup>.

Therefore, all bioethics debate, either the lay or catholic perspective and its themes on the moral statute of portions or the human being as a total, remit to the device of the person. The normative space taken by bioethics seems to emerge precisely from the emptiness initiated by the immunitary paradigm. Therefore, the split made by the device of the person during an extreme technicized modernity, not only makes the individual separated from its own body, but also makes him available to interventions and improvements<sup>35</sup>.

Consequently, it is seen that the use of immunitary paradigm as the interpretative key serves as additional instrument for comprehension and the analysis of biopolitical ambivalence of biotechnoscience and its implications for bioethics. On the one hand, biopolitics gives a central role to body in modernity. On the other hand, this same body is appropriate and available for intervention. Biotechnoscience, as immunitary self-preservation mechanism, operates in order to intervene and transform the biological dimension that, from the biopolitics configuration of modernity, defines men. As a result, the attributes of humanity, that is, those that qualify man as such, become fluctuating and indistinct, allowing a gradation of intermediate stages between human and non-human, including the not-yet-person, the not-fully-person and the no-more-person. It is precisely between those barriers that bioethics has exercised its regularity function, continually debating these statutes<sup>35</sup>.

Bioethics seems, therefore, the act upon a self-preserved second level mechanism, in order to save humanity of the negative effects of immunitary mechanisms provided by technoscience. Its normative space seems to have originated in this complex self conservative dynamics and to be exercised justly when the own attribute of humanity is under debate.

## Final Considerations

The brief genealogy of the immune bioethics drafted in this present work reveals that the perception of threat aroused by the technoscientific development represents more than an inaugural concern, historically delimited. This propellant context impresses permanent and specific characteristics when confronting bioethics to moral challenges. As a unifying element of distinct bioethical conceptions and perspectives, the intent to protect humanity from the threat related to its own efforts of preservation. Therefore, the common thread of bioethics lies in its role as a second level immunitary mechanism.

The proposed understanding of immunity as an interpretative key for both the biotechnoscientific paradigm and bioethics, however, does not constitute as simply systemic. There are, at least, three areas in where this theory is promising for bioethics. First, to face diversity that characterizes bioethics from a common mechanism may represent an instrument to reflect and redirect the internal tensions to the field, contributing to face pressures of fragmentation and under-specialization. Second, the human self-preservation function may give another perspective on the relation with bioscience, strengthening the descriptive capacity of bioethics; and, finally, provide new critical instruments what could contribute to its normative function.

From the immunitary interpretative key, it is observed that bioethical themes are those in where the mechanism of human self-preservation is activated at the same moment when the attributes that regulate and define human beings are in debate. Consequently, the normative function of bioethics is comprehended from a new perspective, that is, resisting to biological reductive conceptions and excluding from social and cultural diversities. It implies in a moral analysis that does not restrict to biosecurity risks and overcomes the opposition between transhumanism and bioconservativeness<sup>36</sup>, because it allows including in its protective scope the human resulted from the cumulative intervention and transformation actions of technoscience.

As immunization effort, bioethics intends to pursue a protection reaching humanity in its two perspectives: as characteristic, that makes singular the individual, and as collective men. The immunitary Motors of biotechoscience, is its objectives and results on the transformation of humanity, individual and collectively, become then fundamental bio-ethical issues. The immunitary horizon is strategic to identify what is excludent in the constantly updated parameters for human self-conservation.

To face the discipline from this perspective, however, reveals challenges imposed to bioethics while immunitary mechanism. To operate in this membrane that, at the same time, separates and communicates individual and community, is the origin of many of the internal debates of the discipline. This perspective contributes to clarify, as an example, why to approximate of paternalism represents a

risk of protection, as well as the fact of individual autonomy to be closer to ethical egoism than it would be desired to be <sup>37</sup>.

The adoption of as immunitary paradigm, as a theoretical systematization about the modern ethos allows the analisis of several antinomies that make part of it, within life and death, individual and community, human and non-human <sup>34</sup>. This comprehension offers, in the one hand, additional tools to identify and avoid individual immunizations that happen at the expense of the whole community. On the other hand, bioethics would have more tools to oppose itself to excludent criteria of life qualification and then to resist to transformations in the parameters of immunization that could cause pressure in the sens of diminishing differentiation and, consequently, human singularity.

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