

The compelling need for ethics and bioethics

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Abstract

This paper discusses the necessity of ethics and bioethics, through the support of Paul Ricoeur and Hannah Arendt, both in conjunction with Habermas. From Ricoeur, we analyze the formula of ethical architecture. With Arendt, we attribute value to living together, to politics and to responsibility for the world. We focus bioethics and the discussion about limits in the collective life; then, we move on to consider the notion of the other and of seeking consensus, stating a seven-principle proposal. We believe that in our time, the tragedy of action and the uncertainty of choices, bioethics and ethical reflection are imperative to the claim of respect for oneself and the other, along with the demand for autonomy and individual and collective well-being.

Key words: Ethics. Bioethics. Trends.

Resumo

A incontornável necessidade de ética e da bioética

Afirma-se e fundamenta-se a necessidade da ética e da bioética, com olhares de interpretação a partir de Paul Ricoeur, de Hannah Arendt e de ambos em conjunção com Habermas. Com Ricoeur, analisamos a fórmula do plano ético. Com Arendt, a valorização do viver em conjunto, da política e da responsabilidade pelo mundo. Olhamos a bioética e a discussão sobre os limites, na vida coletiva, passando depois a considerar as ideias de outro e da procura de consensos, deixando uma proposta de sete princípios. Estamos convictos de que no nosso tempo, no trágico da ação e na incerteza das escolhas, as reflexões ética e bioética são imperativas para a afirmação do respeito de si e do outro, a par da autonomia e da demanda de bem-estar individual e coletivo.

Palavras-chave: Ética. Bioética. Tendências.

Resumen

Insuperable necesidad de la ética y de la biótica

Se afirma y se fundamenta la necesidad de la ética y de la bioética, con miradas de interpretación a partir de Paul Ricoeur, Hannah Arendt y de ambos juntamente a Habermas. Con Ricoeur, analizamos la fórmula del plan ético. Con Arendt, la valoración de la *vivencia en conjunto*, de la política y de la responsabilidad por el mundo. Miramos la bioética y la discusión acerca de los límites en la vida colectiva, para después pasar a considerar las ideas de *otro* y de la búsqueda de consensos, dejando una propuesta de siete principios. Estamos convencidos de que en nuestro tiempo, en lo trágico de la acción y en la incertidumbre de las elecciones, la reflexión ética y bioética son imprescindibles para la afirmación del respeto de *sí* y del *otro*, juntamente a la autonomía y a la demanda de bienestar individual y colectivo.

Palabras-clave: Ética. Bioética. Tendencias.

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The compelling need for ethics and bioethics

The words "ethics" and "bioethics" may be those which, through repeated and distorted use, become family, running the risk of incurring a simplistic reduction. If this article seeks to affirm and substantiate the need for both, of course it will begin by configuring them and give them their own space in which we can subsequently divagate and digress.

The recognition of the place of ethics and bioethics, we will do in the company of two authors² Paul Ricoeur and Hannah Arendt. We can realize Ricoeur as a reader of Arendt, with precious texts on his political thought and a remarkable preface in *The Human Condition*¹. Each one in their own way is deeply involved in the problems of the human condition, on sense interpretation or demand, which is the task of philosophical reflection.

Moreover, both are very clear in this² Ricoeur affirms the conception of reflection as true reappropriation of our effort to exist² and "Think" is the title of the first volume of *The life of the spirit of Arendt*³, in which the point departure for reflection is the question about the relationship between the ability to distinguish what is right and what is wrong and right thinking. The problem of evil worried both, being, however, our conviction that Arendt is one of the central axis, recurrent theme and one of the keys to her thinking, above all the aspect of reflection on totalitarianism. Both thought on power and on the forgotten, and both indicate the bonds of Western philosophical memory: For Ricoeur, the undeniable link the Greek and Jewish culture, for Arendt, the mark of the philosopher model that was Socrates. Habermas, next to Arendt, will bring us to the contribution of the political philosophy ideas, contributing to the outline of a discourse and consensus ethics.

Ricoeur and Arendt addressed the bioethics in different ways², he dedicates some texts in an explicit manner, she, did not, if we look just in an immediate manner, searching for the word. However, the concept is there, in her texts, in the concerns with the human world. This article seeks to present, first, the authors and their thoughts, and then outline the foundations of the compelling need.

Formulas of the ethical plan: readings with Paul Ricoeur

Paul Ricoeur has defined ethics as a sense of a good life with and for others in fair institutions⁴. We designated these elements as "triadic formula"⁵, being that they add different dimensions in which ethics is anchored, discover and rediscovers² the meaning of the formula is not linear or simple; it appeals to the meaning of delicate shape and organization of various ingredients.

His first element relates to each of us, trying to live so that we can predicate as good life and wanting to be happy. We proceed in this way in our practices of life in plans that we design and in the narrative unity in which we assign to what we live,² which means that we formulate what we understand by excellence or by good life and compare what we judge as the realization of our life plan. Moreover, what we interpretate becomes contentment and self-esteem, when we consider that we think and act well, approaching us to living well. Therefore, the fundamental anchor of good life is in praxis.

The second element of the formula with and for others, we are placed in relation with others, with the other without which yourself do not exist. May be others at different distances, acquaintances, friends, loved ones. There is another that represents to the self you like myself, as there is another distant, faceless, who I will never meet, but does exist in my human horizon.

A little in the manner of the existentialists, it would assert that humans do not estimate without the experience of estimating the other and inversely, in an axis of giving and receiving that flows in both directions. There is not always reciprocal in that axis, nevertheless may draw up more the authority of the injunction of the other (in the extreme limit leads to nullification of another) or more, at the opposite extreme, compassion and concern. The friendship that represents this plan makes the transition between the meaning of a good life and justice.

The third element of the formula, in just institutions, brings us to interpersonal relationships for the life of institutions. If we consider that the institution is the structure of living together with a historical community, characterized fundamentally by common customs and usage and not simply by the existence of rules. Arendt stressed, in a happy manner, the ethical primacy of living together over constraints associated with judicial system and political organizations. Also for Ricoeur, equality is, in the life of institutions, what the concern is on interpersonal relations. In other words, the living well of interpersonal relations extends the life of institutions. In addition, justice has by nature an ethical requirement that is not contained in this concern, namely the requirement of equality.

The institution as a point of application of justice and equality as content of the ethical sense of justice, place us on the path of 'each one': what belongs to each one, or what is due to each one. And that each one is not any longer you, it includes a third party, the anonymous, inclusive. But living well beyond interpersonal relationships and extends the life of the institutions (what will link us to Arendt and the primacy of living together).

Let us recall the phrase: sense of a good life with and for others in fair institutions⁴. Let us think that these three elements may be presented as analogous structure, such as self-esteem, concern for others and justice in relation to a third party. The developing an ethic of self-respect and for others, the dimension of active tolerance is needed, reaching the recognition of the profound ignorance that we have² each one about himself, about others and the world in general, and the responsibility to know and take care of himself, to seek the sense of a good life with and for others in fair institutions⁴.

If ethics tries to answer the question "how do I want to live?", we can say that the good life, which is the avoidance of violence and the increase in the human world, has the anthropological anteriority of the ethical dimension of the human being and of life. Ethics itself, reporting to living well with each other, is mirrored in the actions performed. Accordingly, it is understood that the choices they can identify with personal destiny: the destination

each of oneself, what making of and himself.

However, have to submit the ethical intention to the rule proof⁶, as Ricoeur says, claim of universal validity linked to law and rule. The confrontation between principles and complexity of life will make clear the tragic of action and the need to call on ethical background to develop the practical wisdom, the judgment on the situation.

In this respect, the author will converge with Arendt and Rawls⁷, suggesting a reformulation of ethics of argumentation that allows integrate the requirement of universality and the conditions of the context, assuming as dialectic between argumentation and persuasion (the practical item of arbitration of the moral judgment in situation). The moral judgment in a state formed by public debate, the friendly conversation and shared convictions.

In summary, in a first level the ethical life is the desire for personal fulfillment, with and for others, in the virtue of friendship and relating with a third party under the virtue of justice and, on a second level, life ethics is respect for oneself, other and all forms of justice ruled by the predication of 'mandatory' for the actions, a third level comes from the encounter with tragic situations, under the question "how to decipher their lives in situations of uncertainty, conflict or risk?", and practical wisdom emerges as a well-considered judgment of the tragic situation of the action⁸, in the face of conflict. What allows exiting the confrontation is well-considered conviction in which the judgment is based on a singular situation, the tragic action.

Appreciation of living together: readings with Arendt

The hysteria of human beings in the 20th century interwoven with episodes of violence and extreme situations where citizens abandoned public [political] space and dismissed themselves from moral conscience. This idea serves as a backdrop to some works of Arendt, in which we recognize that her writings just appear ordinate and chained after the reading, as stones that fit into a collar. And a possible line [of the reading we did] is of

central concern to think and judge, discern, and choose.

The conception of Arendt around what we do think that consider the supreme attempt of immortality is represented by the political enterprise. All human activities are conditioned by the fact that humans live in society, but action itself is unimaginable outside the human society. The web of human relationships, falling in the interests of the subject as much as actions and their speeches, exists wherever men are together.

The rise of the city gave humans a sort of second life, *bios politikos*. Politics is the space of relations between men, *locus* of affirmation of human diversity and plurality. The action and the word are human activities essentially political and Arendt will underline several times the idea that one cannot reduce the multiplicity of views to a Single and definitive truth, valid for everyone. If the demonstrable truths, as mathematics, can be seen in this way. Moreover, the author suspects of the unanimously, which consider that the death of opinion, because no opinion formation is possible even when all opinions became equal⁹. And through dialogue and discovery of her position that can carry political life between people. The debate allows each to reveal ourselves and to present ourselves in the midst of others, the joy of public life.

They are both strong Arendtian principles in the sense of sharing the land with others, and solidarity between humans and responsibility for the world. Only by understanding the meaning of political conviction, it is possible to avoid the extremes of exaggerated individualism and the deconstruction of the subject (example, by manipulation). Because of human beings (in) capacity, it must deal with the problems of irreversibility and unpredictability of action, which is possible through the powers of promise and forgiveness, resilience against effectiveness of action processes only on condition of plurality.

We must, therefore, distinguish between the constitutive elements of political action: meaning, objectives, purposes and principles. Meaning lies in itself, and does not persist beyond the time that the activity or action is taken. The objective is to have the reverse, just begins to be real when the activity that produced it reaches full term.

The purposes set out the criteria on which that takes place will be judged by that transcend performed as a criterion transcends what should measure. To the persuaded objective, the purposes for which is oriented to the direction and places it as the action unfolds, adds to the fourth element, that is not the direct cause of action or set in movement. Arendt call the principle of action, which is the belief shared by a group. Principles of action cannot only change each season hysterical, but also permutated its position with another element of the action (i.e., being principles in time and objectives or purposes in another).

A careful reader will notice that it was considered the direction, objectives, purposes and principles² and, therefore, the means are excluded. I agree with Arendt, that include the means would instrumentalize the action² perhaps we are the first generation to acquire full awareness of the consequences of a fatal way of thinking that forces us to admit that all means, since they are effective are permitted and justified when is desired to achieve something that is defined as a purpose¹⁰. In human plurality and diversity, opinions have to find a balance between the conviction attempted to impose itself and suffering of having to accept differing opinions. Here, comes the mediation of respect for others, due to conviction of another, so that the debate cannot reach consensus, but the state space of joint deliberation and mutually or reciprocally recognized freedom.

The strength of the faculty of judging, judgment comes from the decision to take in the circumstances, putting ourselves in another's place. So, with Arendt, ethics is not a matter of reason, but of judgment. And one learns to judge performance by applying the maximum (think with an enlarged mentality, think for yourself). The author considered the "banality of evil" in the way Nazi crimes appeared: incomprehensible, unforgivable and enforceable. She affirmed the value of moral and political thought, especially in situations of urgency or situations or border when the past does not clarify the present and now we cannot refer to absolute values.

A deeply humanistic perspective of Arendt, recognizing the limits of the human condition and the tragic, preserves confidence in human capacity to judge and act together. In the political plan, cooperation and participation with the word with the action that makes instance, the outrage (remember the apology of the civil disobedience). The direction of policy was that free human beings, beyond the violence, coercion or domination, had relationships of equals, were not called to command or to obey, governing their affairs by discussion and mutual persuasion.

In the crisis, the limits of tolerance are experienced; limits from which builds the structure of values, according to the historical moment and the perspective marked by the person. Ricoeur¹¹ points two criteria for this: the commitment and conviction. The commitment to discern a range of values, knowing that in doing so we are opting for one option among other possible. This historicity of commitment engenders what Ricoeur calls conviction¹¹: *I venture and submit myself, but I have no choice but to choose.*

Discussion on collective life limits

In the link between the demand for a good life, and the other issues of justice conviction came to where the power binds justice, reflect reflection and precepts that guide the action of the individual. It is clear the link to the respect due to conviction of another², which leads to a polemic tolerance, given the human plurality and diversity. Under the term bioethics huddle ethical issues emerging of new biomedical technologies and extending to environmental problems and the future survival of humanity, namely preservation of an ecosystem that maintains the Earth habitable for humans and ensuring sustainable development.

Considering very different issues qualified as bioethical, such as the medically assisted reproduction, drug research, organ donation and transplantation, euthanasia or palliative care, among health examples. In addition, other issues related to ecology and environmental protection, water, animal experimentation, human resources management, and the social and economic policies.

These issues permeate the life and quality of life of each one. Yes, from each² and we know that it is not possible to accept the relation, roots of the Enlightenment, between science and technology with the well being, health and happiness of people, and no reasonable place exclusively in the hands of scientists and experts the destiny of the organization resulting of a technical society.

The plurality and novelty of the issues currently placed, dealt by bioethics, require careful ethical reflection,² specially because one recognizes to be guided by the principles related to human dignity and responsibility. The precautionary principle advises again that decisions have effects of medium and long term² so that, it is not sufficient the scientific and technical compliance, lack of wisdom to practice in risk assessment and choices under uncertainty.

Bioethics and later ethics (considering up earlier philosophical ethics), centered in a field of action that respects life, having transdisciplinary as trait and strategy. The prefixed trans indicates that, at the same time between the disciplines, across the different disciplines and beyond disciplines. Its objectives and understanding of the world is one of the interactive unit and for such knowledge. So, it only makes sense one transdisciplinary and secular bioethics.

Life, along with policy, outlines around ideas that touch the self, and all the other² thus, considers becoming possible from the construction of the self and autonomy, interdependence and social justice. Let's see: From the self, the idea of autonomy and to build the idea oneself establishes relation between what may be designated as the art of knowing how to live and learn (the ethics dimension) and to live in the city (the political dimension).

Living in a democratic and pluralistic society requires the exercise of citizenship (i.e., the exercise of political, civil and social rights of each), which is not confusingly similar, but complementary, with the development of civic skills (i.e. capabilities, skills and attitudes of participation of each in real collective action). From the other, the notion of building an open system, where what affects one part affects the whole,² considering the interdependence

requires a process that results in contributing to others, a record of ties and cooperation. And, finally, the feeling of belonging to something bigger than oneself; looking to joint, we have the dimension of social justice, which includes the freedom and the individual and collective rights, the articulation with moral responsibility, both in individual and collective sense, and solidarity among all.

Note that one thing is the individual decisions, the freedom of each, affecting only oneself and another thing is as diverse implement a group, society or collective, affecting everyone. From the meeting point, the crossing, that we consider inevitable between ethics, politics and bioethics, based on a certain subject of anthropology.

Consensus is a simple word to explain, quoting a general agreement among members of a group or in broader situation in a community, about a particular item, or topic or subject. It is not a voting system per person, but the result of the way the group or the community makes a decision, establishes a covenant (and this is the sense of agreement). And how to choose or access a comfortable "baseline" for all² so there is not vote or count "hands in the air": who has the most votes does not win.

A consensus does share decision making with everyone; everyone has a voice and is listened to. In such a way that each one adjusts or readjusts their position to hear the arguments of others. Relocate positions and reach a platform discussed and consensually accepted, consented. Therefore, this idea relates to freedom that each one works within a group or community, with the participation clarifies that the subjects and concerns prior and during the decision-making process. The final objective of consensus is the development of a decision that is best for the group as a whole, even if the commitment has to be designed in stages.

A discussion on values is not resolved in the imposition or legitimized in evidence of the individual conscience, a divine mandate or even at the discretion of political power, even legitimized by a (any) majority. The debate driven rules of freedom, equal opportunity, political participation and effective limits logical self-contradiction, gives everyone the

opportunity to inquire and eventually realize that it is (effectively) a matter of freedom.

Nevertheless, in face of one (undeniable and desirable) pluralism of opinions, we consider that the defense believes the opinion by the interlocutors may ultimately bring elements of violence to dialogue spaces.

And this sense of perspective of Ricoeur, Arendt's and Habermas, in what the latter designates terrorism of the pure conviction¹². There are those who become involved in a violent defense of their conviction, even when it seems invincibly erroneous, that exalts and anger. So exacerbated that manifest themselves in the ways of violence. It should also consider the potential suffering of those who find themselves confronted in their convictions,² especially when they are very entrenched.

It can be assumed that the mediation figure becomes necessary, i.e. the existence of mediators. As a way of hetero-composition of conflicts, mediation is carried out by persons not involved, assisting those involved in the solution of conflicts. And this "assist" may be the identification of the points of controversy, to facilitate parties to make decisions that compound and comprising their interests as fully or balanced as possible.

The mediators' purpose is to resolve the conflict with minimal involvement of structures, processes and principles. It is not reaching a decision (as in individual terms), but an agreement and consensus. We would note the third party figure² that we also find in figure of the judge,² placed a fair distance and a three times circle: discussions, consensus and agreement. We believe that mediation by this triad may well be the task of bioethics.

The respect for freedom of the other, the moral principle of respect for the other conviction, is the analysis of tolerance, intolerance and intolerable. The limits that are traced on the frontiers of tolerance itself, that without it would be in itself, intolerable. According to Habermas, the equal rights of all individuals and equal respect for their personal dignity are supported by a network of interpersonal and for reciprocal relations of recognition¹³.

In other words, articulation between the personal opinion (via the autonomy of each person) and the relation with the opinions of

others can be done by argument and negotiation of commitments (and not just, because the consensus can be reached in the discursive way). It is necessary to harmonize oneself and other, interests, desires and beliefs diverge, especially in public space.

Arendt said it is this tolerance that allows for conflicts mediation, introducing the possibility of debate and negotiation to reach agreement. Resuming Habermas¹³, ordinations of each one are (or they are supposed) closely related to the plans and lifestyles. The articulation between morality and freedom with political self-determination as essential existential ethics rebuild the difference between public and private spheres. In a pluralist society, secured freedoms guarantee space for each to pursue their life plan, developed by the concept that each has of what is good.

The other and the search for consensus

Why does one state the compelling need of ethics and bioethics? because of the other, in addition to myself. And this other is plural, diverse. Thinking of the other is conceiving thou, who I know the face, as is a third party, any unknown person but sharing with me humanity.

In the irreducible difference and understanding somehow what the other is part of us, of what we designed it. Besides, if we understand the purpose of the other as an object (so objectively) such would be, first and somehow, the denial even of the other. Let us accept, therefore, as a starting point, the other is irreducible object of everything from science and even the hermeneutical. *The only way to access, the other is from ethics.*

Note that being different does not equate to another. Alterity is undoubtedly important aspect of plurality; may well be the reason why all our definitions are distinctions and the reason why we cannot say that something is not distinct from another. Moreover, seeking for oneself, to know oneself is to ask information to oneself, is asking oneself, to wonder, to inquire, and investigate. Also, this is philosophizing² to question and seek meaning.

And when we ask ourselves, we realize that we change ourselves, even recognizing the same

ourselves.

A photograph of the baby in the crib or toddler dressed in carnival claiming to be me (and others who indicate me) is different from me, but still is me. So, I cannot distinguish the other just for being different, because myself can look the other before me. And even more would note that myself comes in the first instance, by the other.

The other cannot also be understood as the same, in the same way as you may not be suitable as me. It is important that we understood the risk of saying the other in the other contamination by me (as Derrida used say¹⁴). Often, when we say something about the other, what we are doing is looking at the myself mirror, adding that this can be a shapeless, concave or convex mirror, as those at amusement parks. When we tell others consider the possibility that we are thinking of the analogy with other garments or I being in the way "as I see the other", which is much different than the other is like the way judges to be seen.

The will of each one deals with projects and turns wishes into intentions. Our ability to judge makes the judgment about the private individuals, the singular, the choices, the pleases me or dislike me. Let us join now, here, the humanness and plurality that arises from life with others. We may share the same ideas or not. Most likely, we can even share some and disagree with others. Or disagree totally. We speak with many different voices, so we have high possibility of confrontation between the views.

It is not the philosophical freedom that consists in the exercise of our will (or at least, in the exercise of the opinion that we believe to be our will). This is the dimension of freedom in relation to others, which Montesquieu¹⁵ considered two political freedoms² here, there is not a (simple or mere) extension of the self-thinking to a we plural.¹⁶ Habermas would say that it is the inclusion of the other. In everyday life context, the morality of a community is based not only on the ways in which its members should act, but also assuring grounds for consensual resolutions in case of conflicts. We are in the realm of opinion and belief, the self and the other. Because every human being has the right to own ideas, opinions and beliefs, this is an endless possible variety of positioning.

The compelling need for ethics and bioethics

Moreover, the diversity of opinion is desirable, although (or because of this) in place before a controversial setting of opinions and its inevitable need for management. What do we do when our gaze to the other, besides the risk of mirroring, runs seriously the possibility of confrontation of opinions? And conflict? And suffering?

In the first stage, say, appeals to the argument adduced. This is because the views are discussed, if not discussed it would be dogmas rather than opinions. Searching the contours of the differences of opinion is to identify the roots of each opinion, the discussion of reasons or fundamentals of position ² because having an opinion cannot be armor up, shut up in a case, charring an intellectual mutism. When stated opinion, has to be able to establish and justify this view consistently.

What do we do, then? We seek consensus, a level of balance between the maximum and minimum, somewhere that can bear agreement of those involved. Eventually, we begin with a minimum of ethics that does not exclude anyone. The designated ethics of minimum, as Cortina calls it ¹⁷, intends to investigate the commonalities that divergent opinions may agree, in society ² to be able to reach a commonly accepted principles of heterogeneous, pluralist community. It cannot be any space where we can be ² by the risk of render meaningless, but where we can go.

But what principles could be placed under the aegis of the minimum? They say that the various authors could be several. We agree that some of the foundations are the same, and they are interrelated, such as these:

1. Dignity of the human, stated since Kant as the vision of the Kingdom of Ends, humans considered as an end in themselves, not being "able to be replaced by an equivalent"¹⁸, and dignity can be considered how value is inseparable from the autonomy and the common denominator of all humans;
2. The freedom, the possibility of each to participate in public life, not to be dominated or coerced, the ability to decide for oneself on matters concerning oneself with knowledge, electing own conception of good and happiness ;
3. The respect for autonomy, stemming either

dignity or freedom, which anchors in active tolerance in assessing position of ideas, projects and other interests that are reasonable and respectable;

4. In fairness, that is, equality before the law, equal opportunities and compensation of inequalities (as Rawls would say ¹⁹);
5. Solidarity, genuine interest in other human beings, in general centered on reciprocity and cohesion;
6. The dialogue, which meets the requirements of all to participate until the final decision, the willingness to listen to the other, the provision of argument and willingness to change opinion that the arguments convince the other, to seek a fair and open rectifications;
7. The non-maleficence, not to harm the other, putting the principle negative formulation with the base of duty to act well in the view of others and to recognize that a primary requirement of every human being is not to damage the other.

Final Considerations

From the Ricoeur ethics as meaning *a good life with and for others in fair institutions* ⁴ toward living together, which characterizes the human world, with the meaning of Arendt principles in sharing the land with the others, solidarity between human beings and the responsibility for the world. Today in dark times of crisis, experimental tam the limits of tolerance limits from which builds the structure of values, according to the historical moment and the perspective marked by such person ², for this, worth the commitment and conviction.

Living together, politics, is outlined around ideas that touch the self, and all the others ² thus, we consider to settle from autonomy and self-construction, interdependence and social justice. We notice that one thing are the individual decisions, the freedom of each, affecting only oneself and a diverse other are those implemented in a group, society or collective, that affect everyone. From the meeting point, the crossing, we consider inevitable in between ethics, politics and bioethics, based on anthropological conception of the subject.

In other words, the articulation between the personal opinion (via the autonomy of each person)

and the relation with the opinions of others can be done by argument and negotiation of commitments (and not just, because the consensus can be reached in the discursive way). It is necessary to harmonize self and other, interests, desires and beliefs diverge, especially in public space. And because there is the self and the other, plural, diverse, we need ethics and bioethics, so compelling.

The compelling need for ethics and bioethics

Under the aegis of seeking agreement and harmonization, we understand to set seven principles: human dignity, freedom, and respect for autonomy, equality, solidarity, dialogue and non-maleficence. We believe that in our time, in the tragic action and the uncertainty of choices, ethical reflection and bioethics are imperative for the affirmation of respect for oneself and for others, along with the demand for autonomy and individual and collective well-being.

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